Touro Law Review
Volume 8

Number 1

Article 34

1991

Equal Protection

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts
Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Profession Commons,
State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
(1991) "Equal Protection," Touro Law Review: Vol. 8: No. 1, Article 34.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/34

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Equal Protection

1991]

EQUAL PROTECTION

307

crimination. Since the United States Supreme Court, in subsequent decisions, has not explicitly decided whether Batson applies
to the criminal defendant's exercise of race based peremptory
challenges, 4 10 the New York State Constitution and more specifically, under the civil rights clause, provides the unfairly excluded
black prospective juror additional protection from instances of
racial discrimination. Furthermore, aside from race, the civil
rights clause also explicitly mentions color, creed and religion as
impermissible classifications. Therefore any peremptory challenges exercised for such reasons should be prohibited as well.
The court of appeals did not, however, discuss whether classifications not mentioned in the civil rights clause, such as gender,
could be protected under this provision.
Forti v. New York State Ethics Commission 4 n1
(decided April 5, 1990)

Plaintiffs, all of whom are attorneys and former members of
the executive branch, claimed that the implementation of the
1987 Ethics in Government Act4 12 violated their equal protection
414
and due process rights under the state 413 and federal
constitutions, as well as the state's separation of powers doctrine. 4 15 Plaintiffs based their equal protection claim on the fact
that section 2 of the Ethics in Government Act416 treated legisla410. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the United States Supreme
Court held that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080
(1991). Furthermore, the Court stated that "the race-based exclusion violates

the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors." Id.
411. 75 N.Y.2d 596, 554 N.E.2d 876, 555 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1990).
412. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404

(McKinney).
413. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, §§ 6, 11.
414. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
415. The separation of powers doctrine is not found in any explicit clause of
the federal or state constitutions. Rather it is a doctrine derived from the
enumeration of powers to the three separate branches of government found in
both Constitutions. See J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 3.5, at 126-28 (4th ed. 1991).
416. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 2, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1404
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tive and executive branch employees, who were in similar situations, differently. Their due process claims were based on the
premise that section 78(8) interferes with their vested right to
practice law. Finally, plaintiffs argued that the legislation violates
the separation of powers doctrine because only the judiciary may
regulate the practice of law. 4 17 The court upheld the statute, rejecting plaintiffs equal protection, due process and separation of
4 18
powers claims.

In 1987, the Ethics in Government Act (Act) was signed into
law by Governor Cuomo. Section 73(8) of the Act, the
"revolving door" provision, prevented former legislative branch
employees from "engaging in lobbying, for compensation, on
matters in which they were directly involved during their tenure
with the legislature

. . .

only for the remainder of the legislative

term in which the employee's service to the Legislature was terminated. ' ' 4 19 On the other hand, the statute bans former
executive branch employees "from appearing or practicing before
their former agencies 'inrelation to any case, proceeding or
application or other matter' ' 420 for a two year period subsequent
to the termination of their employment. In addition, there is a life
time ban with regard to a case which a former executive
employee was involved with. The objective of this statute was to
prevent former government employees from exerting influence
over former co-workers resulting in an unfair advantage based
upon knowledge gained and contacts made during their course of
employment for the government. In turn, this was aimed at
enhancing "public trust and confidence in our governmental
institutions." 42 1 The court held:
[T]hat the more favorable treatment afforded under the statute to
(codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF LAw § 73(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991)).

417. Forti, 75 N.Y.2d at 607, 554 N.E.2d at 880, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
418. Id. at 604, 554 N.E.2d at 878, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
419. Id. at 606, 554 N.E.2d at 879, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (citing N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991)).

420. Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 73(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1991)) (emphasis in original).
421. Id. at 603, 554 N.E.2d at 877, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 236 (quoting
Governor's Program Bill Mem. Bill Jacket, L. 1987, ch. 813).
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former legislators and legislative employees does not violate
plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection of the law...
[and] . . . do[es] not constitute violations of their due process
rights or the rights afforded by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States Constitution. 4 2 2
The court rejected plaintiffs' equal protection claim because
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the "absence of a rational basis
for the disparities of which they complain[ed]." 4 2 3 A rational basis analysis was used because the plaintiffs did not prove that
"the statute burdens any identifiable 'suspect' class . . . [and
they] have [not] shown that they have a fundamental right to
engage in the unrestricted practice of their profession. " 4 2 4

Although attorneys have a due process right to practice law, this
right is subject to reasonable restrictions that are to be scrutinized
under the lowest standard of review. 4 2 5

The court found that the disparate treatment between the two
classes of employees was justified because the possibility of undue influence is greater in the executive branch than in the legislative branch. Support for this finding was based upon the belief
that a single person's influence in any matter in the legislative
branch is diluted because checks and balances exist. For example,
a bill must pass through two legislative houses to become a law;
legislators must answer to their constituencies; and every two
years there is "an attendant change in membership, political orientation and priorities." ' 42 6 On the other hand, matters coming
422. Id. at 617, 554 N.E.2d at 886, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
423. Id. at 612, 554 N.E.2d at 882, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 241. (citing Maresca
v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 475 N.E.2d 95, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1984)).
424. Id.
425. Id. (citing Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963)
(attorneys have a due process right to practice law). See Edelstein v. Wilentz,
812 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1987)); Nordgea v. Hafter, 789 F.2d 338 n.2 (5th Cir.)
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986); Lupert v. California State Bar, 761 F.2d
1325, 1327 n.2 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 916 (1985); cf. In re
Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979) (the
right is subject to reasonable restrictions which may be reviewed under the
least exacting "rational basis" standard).
426. Ford, 75 N.Y.2d at 613, 554 N.E.2d at 883, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
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before administrative agencies, part of the executive branch, are
resolved by a small number of officials who have broad and
discretionary authority. "Further, the tenure of administrative
agency officials does not depend upon the approval of the
electorate, many are protected by civil service laws and the
myriad of routine decisions these officials make rarely draw te
attention of the news media." ' 427 Therefore, the disparity in
treatment is not irrational and passes the rational basis test.
The court also rejected plaintiffs' due process claim that the
legislation prevents them from pursuing their professional careers; section 78(8) simply does not interfere with plaintiffs ability to practice law, even if it hinders their marketability. "Such
restriction, which is reasonably related to the legislative goal of
restoring public confidence in government, does not violate any
protected property or liberty interest .
"...,428
Furthermore, the
court found that section 78(8) does not alter a term or condition
of plaintiffs' state employment by employing more restrictive
rules concerning their post-state employment opportunities than
they bargained for because plaintiffs had no contractual agreement with the government restraining the state legislature from
4 29
altering post-employment rules.
Finally, the court held that section 78(8) does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine because the legislature does
"regulate many aspects of the practice of law in this State.,, 4 30
As a matter of fact, the judiciary derives its regulatory power
over the profession from the legislature. Furthermore, the statute
427. Id.
428. Id. at 614, 554 N.E.2d at 884, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (citing Hasenbein
v. Siebert, 56 N.Y.2d 853, 438 N.E.2d 877, 453 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1982)). In
Hasenbein, the court held that section 397 of New York State Banking Law,
which precluded the spouse of a niece of a director of a savings and loan
association from being appointed director of the same institution was, "a
rational exercise of the state's police power, reasonably calculated to achieve
its goal of eliminating nepotism in the savings and loan industry." Hasenbein,
56 N.Y.2d at 854, 438 N.E.2d at 878, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (citations
omitted).
429 Forti, 75 N.Y.2d at 614-15, 554 N.E.2d at 844, 555 N.Y.S.2d at
243.
430. Id. at 615, 554 N.E.2d at 885, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
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effects all former executive employees, not just attorneys. "Its
effect on the practice of law is, thus, merely incidental. " 4 31
The court did find that the statutory provision, section 73(14),
which allowed prosecution for a violation of section 73(8) to be
initiated "only upon referral by the Ethics Commission [to be]
highly troublesome.' 4 32 First, it encroaches upon the "power of
the executive branch

. . .

to 'ensure that the laws are faithfully

4 33

executed.'
Second, section 73(14) seems to be inconsistent
with article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution,434
which requires that a grand jury investigate the wilful conduct of
public officers and deliver up indictments when appropriate. The
court of appeals did not address these two issues because they
were not included in the narrow question brought on this non-final appellate division appeal.
In its holding that section 73(8) did not violate the plaintiff's
rights under the equal protection or due process clauses, the court
did not state whether its determination was based on the federal
or state constitution. The court cited to both federal and state
cases for its determination, apparently reaching the same result
under both.
The use of the rational basis standard to scrutinize equal protections claims concerning public employment follows the standard used by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,435 the Court
upheld a Massachusetts statute requiring state police officers to
retire at age fifty. The Court wrote that strict scrutiny was only to
be applied when a "classification impermissibly interferes with
431. Id.
432. Id. at 616, 554 N.E.2d at 885, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (emphasis in
original).
433. Id. (quoting N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 3 which states: "The Governor
shall . . . expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by the
legislature, and shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed.").
434. Id. at 616-17, 554 N.E.2d at 885, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (quoting N.Y.
Const. art. I, § 6, which states: "[T]he power of grand juries to inquire into
the willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indictments or to
direct the filing of informations in connection with such inquiries, shall never
be suspended or impaired by law.").
435. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." ' 436 The Court concluded that
neither situation was present in this case. The Court then referred
to its decision in Dandridge v. Williams,437 where the Court
"expressly stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny 'has
consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities. "438
More recently, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 4 39 the Supreme Court
upheld a similar provision of the Missouri State Constitution requiring state judges, other than municipal judges, to retire at age
seventy. 44 0 Using a rational relation standard, the Court upheld
the Missouri constitutional provision because it "reflect[ed] both
the considered judgment of the state legislature that proposed it
and that of the citizens of Missouri who voted for it.'441 The
Court cited to its 1979 decision in Vance v. Bradly442 and stated
that it was not prepared to "overturn a state constitutional
provision unless varying treatment of different groups is so
unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that it can only be concluded that the legislature's
actions were irrational.'443
The New York Court of Appeals, therefore, parallels the
federal trend by reviewing equal protection claims concerning
laws that affect public employment under a rational relation standard. In addition, the Forti court, although not clearly distinguishing the New York State and United States Constitutions in
its analysis, upheld the revolving door statute under both constitutions using a rational relation standard.

436. Id. at 312.
437. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
438. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970)).
439. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
440. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26 (providing that "[a]ll judges other than
municipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy years .... ").
441. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. at 2406 (citations omitted).
442. 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
443. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. at 2397.
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